Risiko Moral Hazard Pemberian Kuasa Kepada Nasabah Dalam Pembiayaan Murabahah Bil Wakalah Pada Perbankan Syariah

Abstract

Murabahah bil wakalah financing in Islamic banking has emerged as an efficient and flexible instrument; however, in practice, it raises concerns regarding potential moral hazard resulting from the delegation of authority to customers. The delegation of authority in the wakalah contract opens the door to irregularities, such as misuse of funds, transaction manipulation, and the bank’s failure to fulfill the principle of ownership of the goods before the murabahah contract is executed. These conditions imply a violation of Sharia compliance principles, particularly regarding the elements of gharar and the potential for hidden riba. This study aims to analyze the murabahah bil wakalah financing mechanism and examine customer moral hazard risks and their implications for Sharia compliance. The method used is normative legal research with a legislative and conceptual approach, through a literature review of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. The results of the study indicate that, normatively, the murabahah bil wakalah mechanism is in accordance with Sharia provisions; however, in practice, there remains a gap between concept and implementation, particularly regarding the separation of contracts, ownership of goods, and oversight of fund usage. The resulting moral hazard risks lead to an increase in non-performing financing, reputational risks, and a decline in public trust in Islamic banking.